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Abstract
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health researchers are studying the potential for Li-
ion-battery thermal runaway from an internal short circuit in equipment approved as permissible 
for use in underground coal mines. Researchers used a plastic wedge to induce internal short 
circuits for thermal runaway susceptibility evaluation purposes, which proved to be a more severe 
test than the flat plate method for selected Li-ion cells. Researchers conducted cell crush tests 
within a 20-L chamber filled with 6.5% CH4–air to simulate the mining hazard. Results indicate 
that LG Chem ICR18650S2 LiCoO2 cells pose a CH4 explosion hazard from a cell internal short 
circuit. Under specified test conditions, A123 Systems 26650 LiFePO4 cells were safer than the 
LG Chem ICR18650S2 LiCoO2 cells at a conservative statistical significance level.
Index Terms
Batteries; electrical accidents; explosion protection; fires; hazardous areas; ignition; mining 
industry; occupational safety; standardization
I. Introduction
Gas or dust explosions are some of the greatest hazards faced by underground coal mine 
workers. Methane (CH4) gas is released during the mining process and accumulates in areas 
that are not well ventilated. Coal dust accumulations can form explosive dust clouds when 
entrained into the air. CH4 ignitions or explosives can disperse coal dust layers into the 
atmosphere that subsequently ignite and propagate as powerful explosions. Although fatal 
coal mine explosions in the U.S. may be less frequent in modern times, they can account for 
large numbers of deaths, as sadly evidenced by the recent Upper Big Branch disaster, with 
29 killed [1].
The mining equipment used in certain locations of underground coal mines, where there is a 
normal risk of exposure to CH4, must be approved as permissible by the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA). The term “permissible” refers to equipment that meets 
specifications for construction and maintenance, ensuring that such equipment will not cause 
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a mine explosion or fire (30 CFR 75.2) [2]. Permissible equipment may be evaluated as 
intrinsically safe (IS). The 30 CFR 18.2 interprets IS as incapable of releasing enough 
electrical or thermal energy under normal or abnormal conditions to cause ignition of CH4 
or natural gas and air of the most easily ignitable composition.
An MSHA-permissible cap lamp powered by a lithium ion (Li-ion) battery pack ignited a 
fire at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Pittsburgh Safety 
Research Coal Mine (SRCM) office building [3]. The newly purchased cap lamp was placed 
on a wooden pallet and caught fire overnight while on charge. The melted red plastic from 
the cap lamp battery enclosure was found spattered across the office, indicative of an 
explosive thermal runaway event. There was no indication of user abuse that might have 
contributed to the event. A definitive failure mechanism causing the fire was not determined. 
Concerns over fire and explosion hazards prompted MSHA to issue a program information 
bulletin regarding special precautions that should be observed when charging Li-ion 
batteries or equipment containing Li-ion batteries [4].
In recent years, NIOSH has been engaged in new technology development of mine 
communications and tracking equipment (CTE) to satisfy mandates of the 2006 Mine 
Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act. A consequence of the MINER 
Act is the proliferation of backup batteries in underground coal mines to power stationary 
CTE during mine emergencies that may involve ventilation disruption and CH4 buildup. An 
additional fire or explosion hazard involves underground stationary CTE that is on charge 
and unattended for long periods of time and may be exposed to CH4 and/or coal dust under 
normal operation. Stationary battery-powered CTE in coal mines may also be susceptible to 
mechanical damage, such as from roof falls. The 2001 explosion disaster at the Jim Walter 
Resources #5 mine involved a battery damaged by a roof fall [5].
Most recently, the MSHA Approval and Certification Center is investigating a Li-ion-
powered cap lamp that caught fire in an underground coal mine. A written report of the 
incident was not publically available as of this writing.
NIOSH researchers are studying Li-ion-battery thermal runaway potential of MSHA-
permissible equipment in order to develop safety recommendations for underground coal 
mine applications. The study includes an experimental evaluation of potential thermal 
runaway initiating events of cells placed within CH4–air atmospheres to simulate the mining 
hazard. The study focused on internal short circuits induced by external mechanical damage, 
with this failure mechanism known to produce thermal runaway in Li-ion cells. Researchers 
conceived a new method of inducing an internal short circuit for thermal runaway 
susceptibility evaluation purposes that was thought to overcome limitations of two other 
commonly used methods. This work summarizes the literature findings and experimental 
observations from the first phase of the study, along with interim recommendations.1
1The findings and conclusions in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NIOSH.
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QinetiQ North America (QNA) [6] and Roth et al. [7] describe a three-stage thermal 
runaway process observed for certain Li-ion-cell designs thought to achieve high levels of 
performance and safety. These high energy density devices contained electrodes separated 
by a polymer of perhaps a few tens of micrometers thick, immersed in a flammable organic 
electrolyte. Cathode and anode active materials begin to react exothermically with the 
electrolyte above a certain threshold temperature. If the heat is not dissipated, the 
temperature continues to rise above a certain onset temperature when the cell enters stage 
two, characterized by rapid heat release. Venting and release of smoke may occur during 
stage two. Additional heating causes the cell to enter stage three, in which high-rate cathode 
reactions cause the temperature to rise rapidly and flame or explosion to occur. This final 
stage is thermal runaway, which is characterized by a self-heating rate of 10 °C/min or more.
Standard UL 1642 [8] provides requirements for the construction, performance, testing, and 
marking of primary (nonrechargeable) and secondary (rechargeable) batteries containing 
lithium in various forms (metallic, alloy, or ion). Test evaluations include electrical, 
mechanical, and environmental tests. Mechanical integrity evaluations include a crush test, 
where samples of batteries are squeezed between two flat surfaces until 13 kN (3000 lb) is 
reached, at which point the force is released. Battery safety standards IEC 62133 and UL 
2054 specify a similar crush test [9]. The criterion for passing the UL 1642 crush test is that 
the samples shall not explode or catch fire. The UL 1642 interpretation of explosion is when 
the cell or battery contents are forcibly expelled and the cell or battery is torn or split into 
two or more pieces.
There have been numerous reported field failures of Li-ion-battery-powered equipment. 
NIOSH previously contracted with QNA to perform a safety assessment of emergency 
backup batteries and battery charging systems for underground mining applications [6]. 
With regard to the Li-ion-battery thermal runaway hazard, QNA concluded from the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission recall data that more is required for acceptable safety 
than UL testing provides. To help address the mining safety issue, QNA discussed the merits 
of experimental research to crush or puncture Li-ion cells within explosive CH4–air 
atmospheres. Mikolajczak et al. [9] reported investigating hundreds of thermal runaway 
events from the field. These included numerous field failures caused by latent mechanical 
damage, particularly of soft-pouch cells where mild mechanical damage did not cause 
immediate failure, but rather, the cells failed during subsequent cycling.
Tobishima [10] reviewed Li-ion-cell thermal runaway events, safety evaluation methods, 
and materials to improve thermal stability. When describing the UL 1642 crush test, 
Tobishima recommended an alternative test that was asserted to be harder to pass. One key 
feature of the alternative test was crushing the cell to less than half of its original thickness. 
The UL 1642 crush test does not specify a depth of crush.
Tobishima [10] described a nail penetration test, indicating that it was a very important test 
for simulating internal short circuits linked to many actual accidents. However, some studies 
[9], [11]–[14] suggest that the nail test’s ability to create thermal runaway from internal 
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short may be defeated by the nail itself. The described weaknesses of the nail penetration 
test include thermal or electrical energy dissipation through the metallic nail alone or 
through the metallic nail in contact with an exterior metallic cell can. Loud et al. [14] 
observed that a nail penetration test allowed gas and electrolyte to exit the cell at the point of 
penetration. Furthermore, UL 1642 does not prescribe a nail penetration test.
Megerle et al. [15] demonstrated thermal runaway using an aggressive iterative crush 
protocol. They observed that crush tests inducing case cracking generally produced less 
severe results than tests without case cracking.
Mikolajczak et al. [9] demonstrated that crushing the edge of cells is more likely to cause 
cell thermal runaway than crush or penetration perpendicular to electrode surfaces, in 
agreement with the findings in [13]. Mikolajczak et al. [9] provided two explanations for the 
ease of producing thermal runaway from an edge crush, one relating to the inability to 
penetrate the separator in the case of the conventional crush test and the other to electrical or 
thermal energy dissipation through a nail in the case of perpendicular metallic nail 
penetration. For cylindrical cells, the UL 1642 crush test is applied with the cell’s 
longitudinal axis parallel to the flat plates only. The direction of force is perpendicular to the 
electrode surface within the cylindrical cell.
An apparently common safety misconception involves the crush test and internal shorting. 
Arora et al. [16] indicate that the standard cell crush test involves applying a force to the 
cell’s enclosure until an internal short circuit is achieved. However, the UL 1642 crush test 
is stopped as soon as a predetermined force is applied without regard to achieving internal 
shorting. Mikolajczak et al. [9] found that, when crush damage is perpendicular to the cell, it 
may not cause penetration of the separator, and thus, minimal or no internal shorting occurs.
UL 1642 [17] and IEC 62133 standard committees are considering a forced internal short-
circuit (FISC) test for inclusion in newer editions of UL 1642 and IEC 62133. The FISC test 
being considered for IEC 62133 [18] is based on FISC methods described in [19]. A nickel 
particle is inserted inside the cell, and a press machine is used to compress the cell in an 
attempt to force the nickel particle to create an internal short circuit. The FISC test is 
stopped after a period of time once a voltage drop of at least 50 mV occurs, which is defined 
as attaining an internal short circuit. The FISC test is also stopped if the press force reaches 
800 N for cylindrical cells or 400 N for prismatic cells, without creating an internal short. 
The acceptance criterion is no fire. Thus, the proposed FISC test procedures suggest that a 
cell may pass the test without exhibiting any indication of an internal short (press force 
limited) or by exhibiting limited shorting indicated by a voltage drop as small as 50 mV.
Balakrishnan et al. [20] reviewed safety mechanisms in Li-ion batteries. One such 
mechanism is a pressure relief vent often built into the cell. Under severe mechanical and 
electrical abuse conditions, the vent may provide a safe means of releasing internal pressure 
before the cell reaches excessively high temperatures. However, Roth et al. [7] described a 
thermal runaway process where cell venting may be followed by explosive decomposition. 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the cell vent effectiveness, researchers used high-
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speed video recordings in the NIOSH research study to observe the effectiveness of the cell 
venting process as the cell was crushed.
Thermal runaway susceptibility is dependent upon the cell state of charge (SOC) and 
capacity. Cai et al. [12] reported on simulations and experiments of internal short circuits in 
Li-ion and Li-ion–polymer cells induced by “pinching” the cell between two metallic 
spheres. They found that the internal short-circuit risk of thermal runaway increased with 
cell capacity and SOC for three types of prismatic form factor cells studied. White et al. [21] 
conducted accelerating-rate calorimetry (ARC) tests of selected 18650-type cells and 
observed that the onset temperature of a 2.1-Ah LiCoO2 cell at 82% SOC was comparable to 
that of a 1.1-Ah LiFePO4 cell at full SOC. They concluded that self-heating onset 
temperature and self-heating rate were functions of cell energy. In order to factor out these 
SOC and capacity dependences, in the current study, researchers tested two cell designs of 
similar capacity, fully charged.
Several studies [9], [22] indicate that preheated cells are more susceptible to thermal 
runaway. Santhanagopalan et al. [22] developed an electrochemical thermal model and 
conducted experiments of Li-ion-cell internal short circuits. The thermal model indicates 
that a cell passing a short-circuit test at room temperature has a greater tendency toward 
runaway for higher values of the initial cell temperature. They reported that the margin for 
safety is reduced in a preheated cell. A short between a lithiated (charged) anode material 
and an aluminum current collector produced the most heat of the short-circuit scenarios 
studied. Mikolajczak et al. [9] explain that high ambient temperatures or adiabatic insulation 
will increase the likelihood that any given internal fault can drive a cell to thermal runaway 
and thus increase the energy available to heat the cell. IEC 60079-11 [23] and ACRI2001 
[24] specify a maximum ambient temperature of 40 ° C for IS evaluation purposes, unless 
otherwise specified. Thus, 40 ° C may be considered within the specified ambient 
temperature range for “normal” operation of most IS equipment. 40 ° C is below the Li-ion-
cell self-heating onset temperatures [6], [7]. In contrast, the UL 1642 crush test is conducted 
at room temperature.
Some newer Li-ion chemistries are proving to be safer than others. QNA [6] reviewed ARC 
data for several different Li-ion chemistries, including the data published by Roth [25]. 
LiMn2O4 and LiFePO4 chemistries displayed higher onset temperatures than several others 
studied, showing that they were more resistant to thermal abuse. The peak self-heating rate 
was the lowest for the LiFePO4 cell by a wide margin, leading QNA to conclude that 
LiFePO4 cells were the safest on the market. A common LiCoO2 cell chemistry was the 
least stable of those studied. QNA went on to recommend that either LiMn2O4 or LiFePO4 
may be sufficiently safe for underground coal mining applications. Chen and Richardson 
[26] describe the thermal stability of LiFePO4 and its charged counterpart, FePO4, as 
“remarkable” and instrumental in its commercialization as a Li-ion-battery cathode material. 
Hund and Ingersoll [27] reported no sparks or fire from an overvoltage charge abuse test of 
a LiFePO4 cell. Scrosati and Garche [28] suggested that LiFePO4 may be the cathode 
chemistry of choice for some hybrid electric vehicle projects, for safety reasons. Based on 
these findings about potential safety benefits of LiFePO4 chemistries, researchers included a 
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commercial LiFePO4 cell in the NIOSH research study for evaluation as a potentially safer 
cell for powering IS mining equipment.
Magison [29] describes IS equipment and wiring as not capable of releasing sufficient 
electrical or thermal energy under normal or abnormal conditions to cause ignition of a 
specific hazardous atmospheric mixture in its most easily ignited concentration. Hazardous 
atmospheres in underground coal mines include CH4–air mixtures and coal dust. MSHA 
requires [30] cap lamp components to comply with ACRI2001 [24] criteria for the 
evaluation and test of IS equipment. ACRI2001 contains provisions for lithium batteries, 
including a requirement that lithium batteries shall not explode or cause a fire when tested as 
per UL 1642. MSHA relies on UL 1642 cell level evaluations to help ensure intrinsic safety 
in potentially explosive atmospheres.
Somewhat similar criteria for IS equipment used in other U.S. industries are found in 
standard ANSI/ISA 60079-11. This is the U.S. adopted version of the IEC 60079-11 [23]. 
IEC 60079-11 recognizes that some lithium types of cells or batteries may explode. The 
standard notes that “Cells that comply with the requirements of UL 1642 or IEC 62133 or 
other relevant safety standards are considered to meet this requirement.” IEC 60079-11 
permits battery packs containing serial and parallel configurations of Li-ion cells. All of 
these IS standards, national or international, for all applicable industries, rely on other cell 
level safety standards for ensuring intrinsic safety of lithium-battery-powered equipment 
used in potentially explosive environments. The IEC Technical Committee 31 has 
established a working group to address the safety of electrochemical cells and batteries in 
equipment for explosive atmospheres.
Several studies [31], [32] found that Li-ion cells can produce high explosion pressures. Over 
concerns regarding laboratory equipment damage and injury to staff, Yen et al. [31] studied 
explosive failures of Li-ion cells that may occur when subjected to typical safety standards 
abuse tests. The concern was prompted by a chemical hood that was destroyed by the blast 
pressure of failed cells. They conducted an overtemperature abuse test of a 2.6-Ah Li-ion 
cell and measured 10.89 MPa (1580 psi) gauge pressure in an adiabatic calorimeter as the 
cell temperature reached approximately 200 °C. Although not specified in the paper, a 
coauthor indicated that the chamber volume was 17 mL. Jhu et al. [32] also studied the 
explosive failure of Li-ion cells placed within an adiabatic calorimeter. A fully charged 2.6-
Ah LiCoO2 18650 cell initiated self-heating at 129.1 °C, began thermal runaway at 160 °C, 
and peaked at 903 °C. Chamber gauge pressure peaked at 10.797 MPa (1565.9 psi), which 
destroyed their chamber. Subsequent tests used a 150-mL expansion chamber to reduce peak 
pressures to protect the equipment and laboratory personnel. The 150-mL expansion 
chamber reduced the peak gauge pressure to 2446 kPa (354.7 psi) during a test similar to the 
test that produced the 10.797-MPa gauge pressure. Jhu et al. [32] concluded that an internal 
short circuit could lead to violent fire and explosion. With these safety concerns in mind, in 
the current study, researchers conducted cell crush tests within a 20-L chamber with no CH4 
and measured chamber pressures to assess the potential for personal injury.
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NIOSH researchers conceived a new method of inducing internal short circuit for thermal 
runaway susceptibility evaluation purposes that was thought to overcome limitations of the 
flat plate and nail penetration methods. The new method employs a 90° wedge-shaped 
plastic fixture in place of the UL flat plate to compress the cell. A plastic material was 
selected over metal to minimize electrical and thermal energy dissipation by the test fixture 
itself. The wedge shape and point angle were selected because they were thought to be 
robust enough to crush the cell without significant damage to the plastic wedge itself. A 
plastic fixture simulates external forces applied to plastic-wrapped or plastic-encased battery 
packs which are common [9]. Researchers also conducted a series of tests with flat plates to 
simulate the UL 1642 crush tests as an experimental control for tests with the plastic wedge.
Researchers designed and fabricated a custom crush fixture to fit inside a 20-L chamber for 
these experiments. The press uses a small single-acting hydraulic cylinder with a 43-mm 
bore and a 54-mm stroke. The cylinder incorporates an internal return spring; this retracts 
the cylinder ram when hydraulic fluid is released. A cutaway view of the press is shown in 
Fig. 1. The top and bottom plates are connected with a steel tube (not shown for clarity). 
This tube has access holes for installing the battery and Delrin [33] plastic wedge. The 
wedge is made from a 12.7-mm-thick sheet of Delrin by machining a 45° bevel on each side 
to create a 90° pointed edge. A commercially available 0.75-kW hydraulic power unit 
supplies the required flow. The system relief valve is set to produce 13 kN of force at the 
cylinder ram. The press is controlled from a solenoid-operated hydraulic four-way valve. A 
bleed-in flow control is used to regulate the speed of the ram and was set to about 5 mm/s. 
Viatran model 248 pressure transducer measurements are used to calculate cylinder force.
The wedge and wedge holder were fabricated from Delrin [33]. This material was selected 
for its mechanical, thermal insulating, and electrical resistance properties as well as its 
ability to be readily machined. This plastic has high mechanical strength and rigidity, 
excellent resistance to solvents and chemicals, and good electrical and thermal insulating 
characteristics. The material’s properties are listed in Table I. The wedge is considered a 
sacrificial element, and a new one is installed for each test.
For all tests, the bottom platen was fabricated from steel and coated with an insulating paint. 
Its thickness was calculated to position the battery so that, at full ram extension, the Delrin 
wedge would penetrate about 66% into the battery’s diameter. Penetration was greater than 
50%, as recommended by Tobishima [10].
A ram extension with a 13-mm-thick flat plate was fabricated from steel and used to perform 
tests that simulated the UL 1642 crush test Fig. 2. The plate was also coated with an 
insulating paint. The extension length and bottom platen height were selected to allow only a 
slight clearance between them at full ram extension.
An IEC Ex certificate [34] for the manufacturer and model of cap lamp that caught fire at 
the NIOSH SRCM office [3] listed an LG Chem ICR18650S2 or a Sanyo UR 18650F cell as 
approved for use with the cap lamp. Samples of LG Chem model ICR18650S2, cylindrical 
18650 format LiCoO2 cells (LG Chem cells) were purchased through a battery distributor. 
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Codes on the LG Chem cells indicated that they were manufactured seven years prior to 
these ignition tests. A specification sheet for the LG Chem cells [35] describes safety tests 
that the cell should pass, including a flat plate crush as per UL 1642 and a nail penetration 
test. These tests were specified at room temperature. A123 Systems2 model 26650A 
cylindrical 26650 format LiFePO4 cells (A123 cells) [36] with similar rated capacity were 
selected for comparative testing and purchased directly from the manufacturer. A123 
Systems indicated that the A123 cells were compliant with all UL 1642 single-cell tests and 
were manufactured four years prior to these ignition tests. Newer versions of the LG Chem 
18650 and A123 26650 cells have higher rated capacity.
Ignition experiments were conducted in a 20-L test chamber, which can be used at initial 
pressures that are below, at, or above atmospheric as long as the maximum explosion 
pressure is less than 2100 kPa (305 psi). The CH4–air concentration was set to 6.5% by 
volume as per IEC 60079-11 provisions for testing potential thermal ignition sources in 
mines. The concentration of the gas–air mixture was determined by partial pressures and set 
to 100 kPa (14.5 psi) at room temperature. The CH4 source purity was specified as 99.97%. 
The air source was dried and hydrocarbon free with 20.9% O2 by volume. Subsequent tests 
at 40 °C raised the chamber pressure slightly above atmospheric, and researchers bled off a 
small amount of the gas–air mixture to maintain 100 kPa after the temperature stabilized. 
Heat tape was wrapped around the exterior of the chamber. A fan within the chamber 
provided mixing. A furnace heating element placed inside the chamber was used to ignite 
the atmosphere after tests that resulted in nonignitions, confirming that a flammable 
atmosphere was present.
Researchers conducted cell crush tests with no CH4 in the 20-L chamber and measured 
chamber pressures to assess the potential for personal injury [31], [32]. The open head space 
volume inside the chamber was estimated to be 18 L, taking into account the Li-ion cell, 
press, fan, and white LED fixture.
Chamber instrumentation included a gas pressure transducer (Viatran model 218-28) and a 
30-AWG 0.25-mm-diameter (0.01-in-diameter) K-type thermocouple attached to the surface 
of the Li-ion cell. IEC 60079-0 [37] considers surface temperature of equipment under test 
as stabilized when the rate of temperature rise falls to 2 K/h. Researchers waited at least 1 h 
after the cell surface temperature reached 38 °C before conducting ignition tests at 40 °C.
The thermocouple was inserted underneath plastic wrapping around the LG Chem cell, 
against the metallic can that is about 1.3 cm (0.5 in) from the cell end opposite the vent. 
Cardboard insulation around the A123 cell was removed, and the thermocouple was taped 
against the metallic can that is about 1.3 cm from the cell end opposite the vent.
The chamber pressure transducer detected ignitions in conjunction with a high-speed video 
camera. The criterion for ignition was a pressure rise of at least 50 kPa (7.25 psi), a value 
2Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the NIOSH. In addition, citations to Web sites external to 
NIOSH do not constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. Furthermore, NIOSH is 
not responsible for the content of these Web sites. All Web addresses referenced in this document were accessible as of the publication 
date.
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derived from previous explosibility research [38], [39]. Sapphire windows allowed viewing 
inside the chamber. A highspeed video camera (NAC model 512SC) recorded tests at 250 
frames/s. A white LED fixture was placed within the chamber to provide illumination for 
video recording. The cell venting observed prior to ignitions in this study indicated that the 
cell vent was not an effective protection. Ignitions saturated (whited-out) the video 
recordings, whereas nonignitions did not.
A personal-computer-based Labview data acquisition program recorded cell voltages, 
pressure transducer signals, and thermocouple measurements. Data acquisition was initiated 
by a signal from the hydraulic-solenoid-operated four-way valve. An independent laboratory 
calibrated in-house multimeters traceable to the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. Thermocouple measurements were checked in-house using a thermocouple 
calibration cell.
A Vencon UBA5 Battery Analyzer preconditioned and analyzed cells for testing. A software 
package provided user configurable routines for constant current, for constant-voltage 
cycling, and for measuring resistance and capacity. The resistance routine uses a two-step dc 
measurement.
Researchers used Fisher’s exact test [40] to assess the relative safety between two cell 
designs. The null hypothesis was that crushed samples of two different Li-ion-cell designs 
were equally likely to ignite under similar test conditions. A maximum of ten tests were 
planned for a particular cell design. Only a cell design that produced zero ignition in ten 
attempts was to be considered as a safer cell candidate. The alternative hypothesis under this 
scenario was that the alternative cell design was more likely to ignite than the safer cell 
candidate. There was no possibility that the alternative cell design would be observed to be 
less likely to ignite, indicating the use of a one-tailed probability test. This implied that at 
least four ignitions in ten attempts with another cell design would be needed to produce a 
conservative one-tailed significance value of p < 0.05, i.e., a less than 0.05 probability that 
the observed ignitions and nonignitions came from the same underlying population, thus 
rejecting the null hypothesis. The cell designs could then be considered independent from an 
ignition standpoint, under specified test conditions, at a conservative significance level. A 
test series with a particular cell design was ended when either four ignitions were observed 
or a total of ten cells were tested. A series was stopped after four observed ignitions to save 
wear and tear on the chamber instrumentation. An IBM SPSS statistical package computed 
Fisher’s exact test p values using ignition and nonignition data listed in a two-by-two table 
such as that shown in Table V. The test assumes random sampling; a random sequence 
generator provided a random set of serial numbers assigned to cell samples.
IV. Results
A. Cell Conditioning
Cells were conditioned within the manufacturer’s recommendations [35], [36] at room 
temperature (Table II). Cells were cycled through at least three charge–discharge cycles 
using a constant-current constant-voltage routine. Measured discharge capacity was slightly 
below the rated, and resistance measurements were slightly above the rated. A 123 Systems 
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indicates that Li-ion cells may show certain shelf life or calendar-related aging effects where 
impedance grows with time and capacity is lost over time. In addition, internal resistance 
and capacity measurement protocols may influence results. The capacities of the two cell 
designs were similar and greater than 95% of the rated (MSHA recommends battery 
replacement when capacity fades to 80% of the rated [4]). The cells were given a final top-
off charge prior to ignition tests.
B. Plastic Wedge Versus Flat Plate Methods
The plastic wedge and UL simulated flat plate methods were compared in CH4–air ignition 
tests using the LG Chem cells. The cell was maintained at room temperature for the flat 
plate tests as per UL 1642 and at 40 °C for the plastic wedge tests as per IEC 60079-0 and 
ACRI2001. The chamber contained 6.5% CH4–air at 100 kPa. The cylinder force for both 
the wedge and flat plate was set to 13 kN as per UL 1642. The plastic wedge tests were 
stopped after obtaining four ignitions. The flat plate produced no ignitions in ten attempts 
(Table III). The chamber atmosphere was ignited by the furnace element for these ten flat 
plate tests, verifying that a flammable atmosphere was present. The flat plate compressed the 
cells about 18% (Fig. 3).
Video recordings showed nonluminous material ejecting from the cell vent prior to the four 
LG Chem cell CH4–air ignitions. Three of the four cells ruptured and spewed luminous 
sparks from the side of the can close to the plastic wedge, after initial cell venting and prior 
to ignition (Fig. 4). The fourth can did not rupture on the side but spewed sparks from the 
cell vent, after initial cell venting and prior to ignition. Ignitions saturated (whited-out) the 
video recordings.
Fig. 5–Fig. 7 show the time traces for an LG Chem cell CH4–air ignition, crushed by the 
plastic wedge at 40 °C. Fig. 5 shows the cell yielding and hard shorting at cylinder forces 
significantly less than 13 kN. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the pressure and temperature peaks 
from 6.5% CH4–air ignition occurring shortly after the hard short. Summary data for the 
four LG Chem cells that ignited CH4 are listed in Table IV. Measured cell can temperatures 
were lower than the thermal runaway or CH4–air flame temperatures due to the insulating 
nature of the can, plastic cover, and separation distance between the thermocouple and short 
circuit.
Three LG Chem cell plastic wedge tests at 40 °C did not produce ignitions (Fig. 8). These 
cells were hard shorted to a few tenths of a volt within a few seconds after wedge contact. 
The wedge tip penetrated the can in two of the three cells. There were no measurable 
chamber pressure increases. Peak cell can temperature measurements ranged from 84 °C to 
103 °C. The temperatures decayed over a 5-min waiting period, after which the test was 
terminated and the chamber atmosphere was ignited by the furnace element, verifying that a 
flammable atmosphere was present.
The LG Chem cell flat plate tests produced no CH4–air ignitions, no measurable cell can 
temperature increases, and no apparent cell venting, as observed from the video. Seven of 
the flat plate tests produced no cell voltage drops. Three tests showed evidence of soft 
shorting, producing voltage drops of 22 mV or less. A cell voltage and cylinder force time 
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trace for one of the three soft shorts is shown in Fig. 9. Researchers stopped the press 
extension temporarily when 13 kN was reached. Fig. 9 shows that the cylinder force 
decayed over time because of internal hydraulic system leakage. Researchers then retracted 
the cylinder after a short period of time. These three cells returned to their pretest voltage as 
the plate was retracted. Two of the three cells self-discharged completely, and the third 
discharged by 1 V overnight without going into thermal runaway.
C. A123 26650 Versus LG Chem ICR18650S2 Cells
Researchers conducted ten 6.5% CH4–air ignition tests using the A123 cells and plastic 
wedge at 40 °C. These cells were hard shorted to a few tenths of a volt within a few seconds 
after wedge contact. None of the A123 cells ignited the chamber atmosphere. Cell can 
temperatures peaked at 123 °C or less. Video showed all A123 cells rupturing and producing 
smoke near the point where the wedge penetrated the can (Fig. 10). These tests produced 
chamber overpressures of 3.8 kPa (0.58 psi) or less when the cells ruptured, indicating that 
the chamber atmosphere did not ignite. The furnace igniter subsequently ignited the chamber 
atmosphere for all of these tests, confirming that a flammable atmosphere was present. Table 
V lists the A123 and LG Chem cell test data in Fisher’s exact test two-by-two format. The 
one-tailed p value for Table V data is p = 0.015. The two cell designs can be considered 
independent from an ignition standpoint at a significance level of p < 0.05, as discussed 
previously.
D. Cell Crush Tests With No CH4
An LG Chem cell and an A123 cell were each tested without CH4 in the chamber using the 
plastic wedge at 40 °C. The LG Chem cell went into thermal runaway, and the A123 cell did 
not. The ruptured A123 cell produced a 2-kPa overpressure and a peak can temperature of 
86 °C. The LG Chem cell thermal runaway produced 482-kPa (70 psi) chamber peak 
pressure (Fig. 11) and 284 °C peak can temperature, and the high-speed video recording was 
saturated.
V. DISCUSSION
ACRI2001 IS evaluations and ANSI/ISA 60079-11 level-of-protection “ia” evaluations take 
into consideration up to two countable faults. Two-countable-faults-evaluated IS equipment 
is permitted for use in coal mines by MSHA and in other industrial hazardous locations as 
per the National Electrical Code, Articles 500 and 505 [41]. Mikolajczak et al. [9] indicate 
that some field failures involved mechanically induced cell internal short circuits. Stationary 
battery-powered CTE in coal mines may be susceptible to mechanical damage, such as from 
roof falls. For the NIOSH study, researchers charged cells within the manufacturer’s 
recommendations and kept the ambient temperature within the normal range for IS 
evaluations. The tests reported here simulated a single foreseeable internal short-circuit fault 
from an external crush. The number of faults considered was not excessive relative to IS 
evaluation criteria.
There was a clear distinction between ignitions and nonignitions in all tests. Cell ignitions 
produced pressures in excess of 480 kPa, and nonignitions produced pressures well below 
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the 50-kPa threshold criterion. Furnace igniter ignitions produced pressures in excess of 510 
kPa and verified that a flammable atmosphere was maintained in the chamber for all cell 
crush tests that did not result in ignition of the chamber atmosphere.
The LG Chem cells readily ignited CH4–air, whereas the A123 cells did not ignite in any 
test with the plastic wedge. The two cell samples had similar capacities and were tested at 
similar temperatures. The plastic wedge produced hard shorts to a few tenths of a volt within 
a few seconds after wedge contact for all tests. The difference in test outcomes was likely 
due to the ability or inability of an internal short circuit to initiate a thermal runaway 
chemical reaction within the cell. The LG Chem cells were tested at 100% SOC, but 
different results may be obtained if cell SOC were limited to significantly lower values. 
Fisher’s exact test results indicate that the two cell designs can be considered to be 
independent from an ignition standpoint at a conservative significance level. The A123 cells 
were the safer of the two cell designs, under specified test conditions.
Ignition by a heated surface is a function of the heat source dimensions [42]. Autoignition 
temperature (AIT) usually refers to ignition temperature obtained within a heated vessel, 
where the atmosphere is heated through the surrounding vessel walls. Heated wire, rod, or 
tube ignition temperatures are normally much higher than heated vessel AITs. Some CH4–
air ignition temperature data are listed in Table VI. CH4–air AIT is significantly higher than 
AITs for some typical Li-ion electrolyte components summarized in [9]. Mikolajczak et al. 
[9] indicate that temperatures produced by cell thermal runaway reactions are considered 
sufficient to cause hot surface ignition of flammable mixtures but do not reach levels that 
will cause the melting of pure copper (1080 °C). In some cases, very small points of pure 
copper, nickel, or steel melting were found within a cell, attributed to internal electrical 
arcing or shorting [9]. By comparison, Kuchta [42] lists a 1220 °C ignition temperature for 
CH4–air ignited by a heated Nichrome wire. CH4–air ignition temperatures are significantly 
higher than those for many industrially important explosive atmospheres [43]. The results 
reported here should not be considered conservative for explosive atmospheres with lower 
igniting temperatures than CH4–air.
The flat plates produced no hard shorts within the LG Chem cells at 13-kN applied force, 
and a few observed soft shorts returned to pretest voltage after the plate was retracted. These 
flat plate tests provided some assurance that this particular sample of cells was compliant 
with UL 1642 crush test requirements, as specified [35].
The plastic wedge produced hard shorts in all tests reported here with relative ease. The 
wedge crushed the cell to less than half of its original thickness as recommended by 
Tobishima [10], using a fraction of the applied force specified in UL 1642. Researchers 
limited wedge penetration to approximately 66% of the cell diameter. The pointed edge of 
the wedge overcame the difficulty of penetrating the separator, as described by Mikolajczak 
et al. [9]. The applied pressure did not damage or melt the wedge tip significantly in tests 
that did not produce ignition. The plastic wedge tip melted during tests that produced 
ignitions. A plastic fixture simulates external forces applied to plastic-wrapped or plastic-
encased battery packs which are common [9]. The plastic wedge crush method does not 
compensate for potential heat dissipation through a cell’s metallic can. The plastic wedge 
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minimizes energy dissipating effects of the test fixture itself, compared to metallic nails. 
Safety standards organizations may wish to consider the plastic wedge crush test, in 
response to field failure reports involving external mechanical damage [9].
The UL 1642 interpretation of explosion is when the cell or battery contents are forcibly 
expelled and the cell or battery is torn or split into two or more pieces. The A 123 cells 
pressed by the wedge ruptured and produced smoke but did not ignite the chamber 
atmosphere. These results suggest that ignition of the explosive atmosphere in question may 
be a more appropriate failure criterion using the plastic wedge, for IS evaluation purposes.
The MSHA-approved Li-ion cap lamp battery contains a multicell battery pack within a 
sealed plastic enclosure. The LG Chem cell thermal runaway test with no CH4 in the 
chamber produced a significant chamber peak pressure of 482 kPa (70 psi). Although the 
peak pressure was orders of magnitude less than those reported in [31] and [32], the 
chamber provided about 18 L of head space to allow expansion and reduce peak pressure. 
Peak pressures will be significantly higher than that found in this study within significantly 
smaller volume and sealed enclosures and under otherwise similar test conditions.
Observed thermal runaway with the LG Chem ICR18650S2 cells fully charged and not 
charging suggests that the field failure of the MSHA-approved cap lamp in the NIOSH 
Pittsburgh SRCM office conceivably could have involved an internal short-circuit cell fault 
while under normal charge, and not necessarily a charging fault.
Results suggest the plastic wedge test should be a more severe test than the nail penetration 
test specified in [35], potentially due to elevated ambient temperatures and the electrical and 
thermal insulating properties of the plastic.
VI. Conclusion
IS evaluated equipment powered by LG Chem ICR18650S2 LiCoO2 cells has posed a CH4 
explosion hazard from cell internal short circuit.
Under specified test conditions, the A123 26650 A LiFePO4 cells were safer than the LG 
Chem ICR18650S2 LiCoO2 cells at a conservative statistical significance level. Other 
potential failure modes should be considered, as appropriate.
IS evaluated equipment powered by cells with similar form factor, chemistry, and charge 
capacity to the LG Chem ICR18650S2 should be reevaluated per an appropriate cell internal 
short-circuit test within suitable atmospheric conditions (gas mixture and ambient 
temperature).
There was a clear distinction between ignitions and nonignitions in all tests. Ignitions and 
nonignitions produced chamber pressures well above and well below the threshold criterion, 
respectively.
The plastic wedge crush was a more severe test than the flat plate crush. The plastic wedge 
produced deeper penetration and lower impedance (hard) shorting while using a fraction of 
the applied force of the flat plates. The plastic wedge electrical and thermal insulating 
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properties minimize energy dissipating effects of the test fixture itself. A plastic fixture 
simulates external forces applied to plastic-wrapped or plastic-encased battery packs which 
are common.
Vents in the LG Chem ICR18650S2 cells were not reliable protection against thermal 
runaway in the plastic wedge tests. Venting was observed prior to ignition in all LG Chem 
cell tests that produced ignitions.
The LG Chem ICR18650S2 cell thermal runaway test with no CH4 in the chamber produced 
significant chamber pressures with relatively large head space volume.
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Drawing of plastic wedge crush fixture with LG Chem cell.
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Drawing of flat plate crush fixture with LG Chem cell.
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Flat plate compressed the LG Chem cells about 18% without igniting 6.5% CH4–air.
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Ruptured LG Chem cell crushed by the plastic wedge that ignited 6.5% CH4–air.
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Graph showing that an LG Chem cell hard shorted as the plastic wedge applied force 
reached 4.75 kN (1065 lb).
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Graph showing that an LG Chem cell hard shorted prior to 6.5% CH4–air ignition indicated 
by 586-kPA (85 psi) peak chamber pressure.
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Graph showing that an LG Chem cell hard shorted and the cell can surface temperature 
reached 221 °C during a 6.5% CH4 –air ignition.
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Photograph showing an LG Chem cell crushed by the plastic wedge that did not rupture nor 
ignite 6.5% CH4–air at 40 °C ambient temperature. The cell hard shorted.
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Time traces of cell voltage and flat plate applied force, showing that a soft short appeared 
and disappeared as the plate was extended and retracted.
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Ruptured A123 cell crushed by a plastic wedge that did not ignite 6.5% CH4–air.
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LG Chem cell crushed by the plastic wedge went into thermal runaway and produced 482-
kPa (70 psi) peak chamber pressure with no CH4 in the chamber.
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TABLE I
Delrin Properties and Characteristics
Property Value
Yield Stress, MPa 71
Tensile Strength, MPa 96
Shear Strength, MPa 62
Tensile Modulus, MPa 3000
Surface Resistivity, Ω >1E15
Thermal conductivity, W/m-K 0.33
Hardness, Rockwell M scale 92
Melt temperature, °C >200
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TABLE II
Cell Conditioning Summary Data
LG Chem A123
Charge, discharge voltage 4.2, 3.0 3.8,2.0
Charge or discharge constant current (A) 1.075 3.0
End charge current (mA) 50 50
Rated capacity (Ahr) 2.2 2.2
Measured discharge capacity (% rated) > 95% > 96%
Rated impedance @ 1 kHz (mΩ) 90 8
Measured resistance range (mΩ) 113 to 135 25 to 43
Cell age when tested (years) 7 4
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TABLE III
Flat Plates Versus Plastic Wedge, 6.5% CH4–Air Ignition Tests, LG Chem Cells
Ignitions No ignitions Totals
Plastic wedge, 40 °C 4 3 7
Flat plates, 25 °C 0 10 10
Totals 4 13 17
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TABLE IV
Chamber Sensor Summary Data, 6.5% CH4–Air Ignitions, LG Chem Cells, Plastic Wedge, 40 °C
Cylinder force at ignition, kN (Lbs) 4.75 to 5.96 (1068 to 1340)
Peak chamber pressure, kPa (psi) 586 to 738 (85 to 107)
Peak cell can temperature, °C 221 to 360
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TABLE V
LG Chem Cells Versus A123 Cells, 6.5% CH4–Air Ignition Test Results, Plastic Wedge, 40 °C
Ignitions No ignitions Totals
LG Chem cells 4 3 7
A123 cells 0 10 10
Totals 4 13 17













Dubaniewicz and DuCarme Page 34
TABLE VI
Selected CH4–Air Ignition Temperatures (in Degrees Celsius)
AIT
(800 mL vol.) [44]
Heated air jet
(1 cm dia.) [42]
Heated nichrome wire
(0.1 cm dia.) [42]
600 1040 1220
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